The Political Geography of Civic Engagement in Ukraine, 1994-1998.

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ABSTRACT

It is widely believed that democracy requires an active citizenry, independent and autonomous from the state. In the countries emerging from the former Soviet Union, research has not documented widespread civic engagement, and a lack of empirical data has hampered detailed investigations of civic engagement in the region. In our own study, longitudinal data from 1993 on public attitudes towards democracy and the state of the Ukrainian economy, as well as information from an almanac of non-governmental organizations in Ukraine, show that deep dissatisfaction with the economic and political transitions are not accompanied by significant grassroots or mobilizations. Over the past decade, fewer Ukrainians express interest in either formal or informal politics as they cope with worsening material conditions in their everyday lives. Respondents in the West, especially in Galicia, are more optimistic about the status of Ukrainian democracy and the future of Ukrainian society. However, these attitudes cannot be easily explained by oblast (regional) characteristics. The level of non-governmental organizational activity is strongest in Galicia and in the industrial east of the country, but the distribution of this activity is not meaningfully correlated with the economic fortunes of individual oblasts and only weakly related to the distribution of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. We conclude that Ukraine is unlikely to witness major territorially-based ethnic or nationalist strife because political attitudes and popular mobilization are not coincident with strong regional cleavages.

Parallel to continued uncertainty about the nature and scope of political and economic transition in Russia, Ukraine has received increasing notice in foreign policy discussions. This attention is partly due to efforts by national politicians, like President Leonid Kuchma, to portray Ukraine as a reliable Western ally and aspirant to the western European institutions. At the same time, Western strategists and commentators, such as Brzezinski (1997) argue that Ukraine is a valuable bulwark against Russian revanchism. Strobe Talbott, the U.S. Under-secretary of State recently referred to Ukraine as "the linchpin of the new post-Cold War Europe" (quoted in Kuzio, 1995, p. 16). Secretary of State Madeline Albright nominated Ukraine (along with Nigeria, Colombia, and Indonesia) as four initial members of a "democracy club" whose transitions are vital to U.S. global strategic calculations (Interview in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 18, 1999, A11). Given the indefinite contours of the New Europe, and the yet to be finalized list of states to be included in (Western) European multi-lateral organizations, Ukraine is poised to be either the farthest eastern borderland of Europe or the farthest western borderland of Eurasia (O'Loughlin, 1999).

Ukraine's geo-strategic importance emanates from its population size (51 million), its location in the historic "crush zone" of East-Central Europe, and its potential military might. In 1997, the country had 400,000 active-duty troops and an additional 1 million in reserve; until that year, Ukraine was a member of the nuclear club, with 1,800 nuclear warheads on its territory. However, the metaphor of 'linchpin' suggests that Ukraine's strategic role in East-Central Europe is far from predictable (Mroz and Pavliuk, 1996). Domestically, Ukraine faces a series of challenges, combining dual transitions to a market economy and a stable, democratic state. To date, the political transition has been complicated by a plummeting economy (the 1998 GDP was 63% lower than the 1989 figure; *Economist*, December 5, 1998, p.122), a sizeable minority (Russian-speakers account for 22% of the population), and territorial disputes (the eventual status of the Crimean peninsula is still in doubt). Each of these factors presents an obstacle to building an effective state apparatus at the national level. The greatest potential barriers to the consolidation of a unified Ukrainian nation-state are lingering regional differences, and post independence surveys of political attitudes and election results reveal stark contrasts between East and West Ukraine. Although highly generalized, this regional political divide is overlain by ethnic, linguistic, and nationalist distinctions as well. The crucial

question that arises is whether this type of regional distinctiveness is diminishing or intensifying during the transition to a political democracy. Has the shift to a democratic regime encouraged the entrenchment of regionalized special interests or has it nurtured the development of a unifying civic culture spanning Ukraine's diverse social landscape?

It is now a tenet of post-Soviet studies that sustainable democracy in former Communist states depends on the emergence of an autonomous citizenry -- independent from formal state institutions and able to mobilize voluntarily on the bases of shared social and economic interests (Gibson, 1996; Kubicek, 1996; McFaul, 1993; Ost, 1993; Shlapentokh, 1989). The argument holds that successful transitions to democracy are predicated on the consolidation of a civil society underlain by a common set of values and beliefs, or civic culture. Civil society thus creates the conditions under which the formal structures of democracy can take root. With the exception of Galicia (Western Ukraine) and the Baltic republics, civil society has historically been weak in the states of the former Soviet Union (Alapuro, 1993). Though the era of glasnost and perestroyka generated an impressive array of informal social movements in Ukraine and other Soviet republics (Sedatis and Butterfield, 1991; Petro, 1995), these movements did not provide a stable foundation for the establishment of civil society after 1991. Now in Ukraine, as in other newly independent states of East-Central Europe, the formation of civil society must occur simultaneously with the construction of a new national identity and the legitimation of a new national government.

In this paper, we investigate the development of civil society and civic culture in Ukraine in the post-independence era. Like previous investigators who have analyzed the nature of post-Soviet civil society (Gibson and Duch 1993a, 1993b; Miller, White and Heywood, 1998; Reisinger, Miller and Hesli, 1994), we examine survey data of public attitudes, but we focus on the geographic distribution of attitudinal factors. Additionally, we examine the status of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Ukraine in order to measure levels of civic participation and to gauge the degree to which an autonomous public sphere has emerged during the past eight years. Utilizing oblast-level data, we analyze the role of regional contexts and local economic circumstances in mediating attitudes towards, and participation in, civil society. Although

regional variations in the political development of former Communist states have been acknowledged, the geography underlying the evolution of civic culture remains virtually unresearched.

The paper is organized into four principal sections. In the first, we review the literature on the role of civil society and civic participation in creating and sustaining the conditions for successful democracy. We contrast ideal scenarios with the current situation in Ukraine (national approval for democratic principles, but low public confidence in the practice of democracy). We note especially regional contrasts in public attitudes and electoral behavior. Next we turn to the question of NGOs in Ukraine, examining data on attitudes towards, and participation in, such organizations. We note the generally low level of NGO activity across Ukraine, but still maintain the importance of looking at the question of whether the level and form of NGO activity contributes to unified civic culture or reinforces regional distinctions in the formal political arena. In the third section, we examine the actual level of NGO activity and the regional contexts in which it forms. Here, three distinct types of oblast-level data are employed: information from a national directory of registered NGOs; results from national public-opinion survey conducted in 1994; and, official socio-economic indicators. In the final section we utilize regression analysis to determine whether regional factors can explain the level and type of NGO activity present in individual oblasts.

Civil Society in Post-Soviet States

While there is general agreement that more civil society activity is better and that “trust breeds trust” (Lane, 1959), a reading of the literature applied to the former Communist countries indicates that a universalist appeal permeates the discussion. Gellner (1991) argues for widespread adoption of the principles and practices of Western civil society as a necessary element of democratization in formerly-authoritarian societies. While the term “civil society” retains a certain vagueness, the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as bodies independent of the state is paramount. But in many societies slowly and hesitantly emerging from decades of authoritarian rule, the extent to which the state allows autonomous civil society is still to be determined. Suspicious of NGOs, especially in ethnically-divided societies, state apparatuses try to ameliorate the perceived reduction of state power caused by a growing civil society. If

NGOs are ethnically- or regionally-aligned and do not reach across identity divides, the possibilities for further division of new democratic societies are enhanced.

Turning the civil society argument on its head, Riabchouk (1998) makes the case that the absence of a civil society in Ukraine has helped to reduce ethnic and national turmoil in that new state. In a three-way divided society with no majority like Ukraine (Russophone Russians, Russophone Ukrainians and Ukrainophone Ukrainians), civil society organization will likely coincide to ethnic, national, regional and language lines. Ukraine adopted a civic definition of nation early in its years of independence after 1991 and as a result, the door was open to Russians and to Russian-speakers to be viewed and to view themselves as citizens of the new Ukraine. The civic definition promoted an inclusive style of nationalism for the diverse populations. Continued weakness of civil society in a context of state- and nation-building can moderate support for radical right movements that are often associated with national identities. However, as we will show on the basis of an examination of civic engagement by oblast, there is some evidence for the formation of organizations in the western Ukrainian region of Galicia, an area that is traditionally known for political and social activism.

Motyl (1998) claims that as Ukraine slips further toward "Zaireization" (a parasitic state apparatus in a corrupt and impoverished society), a civic approach to nation-building will be successful only if people develop loyalty to a territory since loyalty to a corrupt proto-state is unlikely. Before a fully-developed civil society can emerge, the parasitic state has to be reformed and its successor must reduce the widespread levels of dissatisfaction and distrust. To reduce tension, Ukraine, through political leadership from the center, has developed a kind of "consensus" politics whose dominant theme is avoidance of ethno-national conflicts (Birch, 1998; Kuzio, 1997b). In such a tyranny of consensus, political groupings are temporary and temperate. As Kuzio (1997a) notes, predictions of the demise of Ukraine, because of severe internal ethnic-national strife, have been wide of the mark. Constitutional accommodation of differing national traditions and the entropic and chaotic nature of Ukrainian state-building have precluded dominance by any group. Instead, power is divided between national and local oligarchs, and the economic and political realms are the continued subjects of internal power struggles.

Despite the relative increase in attention to the nature of civil societies of the former Soviet Union, few empirical studies of the types and activities of local-level civic engagement have been conducted. Numerous surveys of the populations of the former Soviet republics have documented both the low levels of trust in government connected to rising levels of dissatisfaction with the political and economic transitions and declining participation in elections, political life and organizational memberships. But these low rates are not particular to the former Soviet states. In a world-wide survey of 63 countries, titled the World Values Surveys, two dominant themes emerge; over 80% of the populations surveyed support democracy as an abstract concept and strong majorities for this concept can be found in all world regions, including the former Soviet Union. Secondly, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the practices and procedures of democracy and this dissatisfaction extends to countries who have been stable and democratic (Klingenman, 1999). For example, "support for democracy as an ideal form of government" lies at 97% in Azerbaijan, 88% in Yugoslavia, 88% in the United States, 75% in Belarus, 75% in Ukraine and 51% in Russia. These values are correlated with positive evaluations of regime performance that stands at only 10% in Ukraine, 8% in Belarus and 4% in Russia. Confidence in parliament or legislative assembly ranges from 69% in Norway to 15% in Argentina, with the value for the U.S (25%) not differing significantly from that of Russia (23%), Belarus (30%) and Latvia (25%). In a separate survey in Eastern Europe on "satisfaction of the democratic process in the 1990s", the ratios expressing satisfaction was 20% in Belarus, 20% in Ukraine, 8% in Russia and 6% in Moldova, but 56% in Romania and 48% in Poland. (All figures are from Klingenman, 1999). Trust and support for democracy indicates the widespread belief that the survival and sustainability of democracy in parts of the world that were authoritarian until a decade ago is predicated on a broad and deep foundation of approval from a large ratio of citizens. Our argument in this paper is that democracy, at least in the form that is has existed since about 1800 in Europe and North America, needs more than strong popular support. It also needs an engaged and active citizenry, visible in participation in political life and civic engagement in localities. Otherwise, the danger of "illiberal democracies" (democratic procedures without key elements of democratic societies such as civil liberties, political and economic freedoms, and social

choices) will be enhanced, not only in new democracies (Zakaria, 1997) but also in the United States (Kaplan, 1997; Putnam, 1995).

Public Attitudes and Political-Economic Transition in Ukraine

In East-Central Europe one of the greatest dangers to the consolidation of democratic, national polities is the possible transformation of public frustration about the process of political-economic transition into ingrained distrust of the very institutions that are meant to serve as pillars of the post-communist social order. In cross-country comparisons, Rose and Mishler (1997) and Miller, Hesli and Reisinger (1997) detect strong and consistent support for democratic principles and values across the region. In both works, and in a separate study (Mishler and Rose, 1997), the forecast for the consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe is highly optimistic: "There is little basis… to fear that the collapse of democracy is imminent or that a return to authoritarianism is inevitable. To the contrary, as long as the new democracies of Central or Eastern Europe protect the individual liberties that citizens so highly value, skepticism is unlikely to degenerate into distrust" (Mishler and Rose, 1997, p. 447). However, across the region there is an increasingly sharp distinction between support for abstract democratic principles and growing dissatisfaction about the practical achievements associated with a shift to market economies and pluralistic forms of political representation. In many countries significant portions of the national population are dissatisfied with the supposed social and economic progress achieved since independence. Ukraine is a prime example of a country in which popular support for democratic ideals and even market economics contrasts with measurable discontentment over declining levels of material well-being.

In recent years, Ukraine has been the site of numerous nation-wide surveys, either funded or directly implemented by Western-based agencies or scholars. (This phenomenon undoubtedly reflects the central position of the country in wider geopolitical calculations). Among these surveys, a longitudinal series conducted by SOCIS-Gallup for the International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) reveals important trends in public attitudes towards political and economic change in Ukraine. The most recent IFES survey conducted in June 1998 shows that the portion of respondents expressing "dissatisfaction" with the

"situation in Ukraine today" has stabilized at 96%, up from 91% in 1994 and 1995. According to the survey results, the principle reasons for dissatisfaction are: high levels of poverty (indicated by 45 % of respondents), non-payment of wages (24%), high unemployment (23%), and general conditions of chaos and instability (16%). As in previous surveys, about half of the population believes that the economic situation in the country has worsened compared to the preceding year (data from IFES, 1998b). These perceptions of intensifying material deprivation are supported by more objective measures of living standards in Ukraine since independence. Van Atta (1998) has shown that Ukrainians were spending 57% of their income on food in 1997, up from 33% in 1990. Examining the consumption of various food items, Van Atta finds that per capita meat consumption is almost down by half since 1980 (from 60.7 kilograms to 34.7 kg in 1997), milk consumption is down from 330.8 kgs to 210.4, potato consumption is stable (134.4 kg in 1997) and cereal consumption is also down from 146 kg in 1980 to 126.5 kg in 1997. It is noticeable from Van Atta's (1998, 610) time-series of food consumption that the biggest declines began after independence, in 1992-93.

What continues to puzzle many observers is why continued dissatisfaction and dropping living standards have not translated into political opposition or public outcry. The answer, in brief, is that as the national economic situation has worsened, political alienation has simultaneously risen. Based on the 1998 IFES survey, only one-third of Ukrainian adults indicate that they are informed about political developments, while only 26% of respondents believe that voting in national elections offers a chance to influence decision-making in Ukraine. The level of alienation is further marked by a declining voter turnout (77% in March 1998 parliamentary elections) and low levels of trust in formal state institutions. A non-IFES poll conducted by SOCIS-Gallup in 1996 showed that public trust in state agencies was highest with respect to the Ukrainian armed forces (40%), followed by the National Security Service (25%), the office of the President (20%), the police (20%), the courts (17%), and local administrative councils (15%). The national government was trusted by only 10% of respondents, while the parliament (*Verkhovna Rada*) was trusted by a meager 8% of those surveyed. When asked "who has the real power in Ukraine?", 35% of respondents nominated "the mafia, the criminal world, shadow economy businessmen", 23% listed "corrupt state bureaucracy", and 12% believed it was "financiers, merchants, employers, businessmen". Only 5% believed that politicians seeking

office were trying to help Ukrainian society and people (SOCIS-Gallup, 1996). As these figures might suggest, in cross-national comparisons of the "new democracies of east and central Europe", Ukraine ranks consistently at or near the bottom of the list in terms of political trust indicators (Eurobarometer, 1996).

As in other democracies, national trends in public dissatisfaction and political alienation tell only part of the story in Ukraine. The country displays pronounced regional differences in rates of economic decline, as well as significant regional variations in levels of support for the political process of state-building and optimism concerning the future of the national economy. One of the most often cited regional distinctions in Ukraine is between the east and west of the country. In Soviet times, the eastern region of Ukraine – centered on Donets'k oblast – was one of the key industrial regions in the USSR (The Ukrainian oblasts are identified in Figure 1a). Since independence in 1991, this region has experienced the most severe economic decline within the country as a whole. This has led to a relatively high level of labor unrest, with frequent strikes and demonstrations concentrated in the industrial heartland of Luhans'k, Donets'k, and Kharkiv oblasts. Not surprisingly, the Ukrainian Communist party, by far the largest party in country with 22% of the vote in the 1998 parliamentary elections, receives its strongest support in East Ukraine. This general correlation of economic decline and political support for the Communist Party is mirrored in southern Ukraine, a region that includes Crimea, and the Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts. Western Ukraine stands in marked contrast to both the East and South. This region is distinguished by lower levels of industrialization, a higher proportion of Ukrainian speakers, and an historical-cultural association with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and central Europe. Western Ukraine was home to Ukrainian nationalist movements in both Tsarist and Soviet times. Today, oblasts such as Ternopil and L'viv consistently support Rukh and other nationalist parties. Surveys in Ukraine reveal that the political distinctions between the East-South and the West are strongly correlated with ideological differences concerning the country's transition to a liberal market-democracy (Kubicek, 1999).

It is important to note that the generalized divide between East and West Ukraine is overlaid on a complex mosaic of oblasts that have experienced varying levels of economic success and decline. Utilizing the United Nations' Human Development Index from 1996, it is possible to discern an extremely wide range

of socio-economic contexts within Ukraine, around the average rank for the country: 110th of 175 countries. The difference between the country's most developed region, Poltava oblast, and its least developed, Transcarpathia oblast, is equivalent to that of 45 countries in the UN's world rankings. While there are clusters of high and low development scores within Ukraine, there is no consistent divide between West and East that suggests that one macro-region is uniformly more developed than the other. At the oblast level, it seems just as likely that the same populations (i.e., in terms of class, age, etc.) in the West and the East will manifest similar levels of dissatisfaction and political alienation, regardless of location. The central question can thus be stated: Are changing socio-economic circumstances the primary factors in determining public attitudes toward political-economic transition or are there longer-standing cultural-historical factors that might influence attitudes towards the shift to a market economy and liberal democracy?

Returning to the 1998 IFES survey cited previously, results indicate consistent national trends in support for Ukraine's nascent market economy and democratic government. When asked to select the economic model which Ukraine *should* follow, 39% of respondents favored a market economy, while 31% chose central planning (40% responded "I don't know").[2] When asked about the current state of democracy in Ukraine, respondents were more skeptical. Only 20% characterized the country as a working democracy, as opposed to 52% who claimed the country had yet to achieve the status of a democracy. These national scale figures, however, disguise significant regional variations.

Support for the market as an economic model was strongest in the capital city of Kyiv (65% of respondents there selected the market option, while only 19% opted for central planning), and in the West (64% responded in favor of the market, while only 8% favored central planning). In the East-South, the support for the alternative economic models was more evenly split. In the East 31% of respondents approved of the market model; 36% favored central planning. In Crimea, levels of support for the market and central planning were 32% and 30%, respectively. The 1998 IFES survey also revealed regional variations in the evaluation of Ukraine's transition to a political democracy. In the Northwest, 50% (in the West 44%) of respondents expressed the conviction that the country was already a functioning democracy.

Meanwhile, in the East and in Crimea, the proportion of respondents adopting this view was only 18% and 15%, respectively.

On the basis of the 1998 IFES survey, it is possible to argue that the complex mosaic that characterizes levels of economic development in Ukraine is mediated by broader, perhaps more encompassing, regional differences in terms of public attitudes towards political and economic change. The survey, for example, lends credence to the notion of a significant political divide between West Ukraine and the country's eastern and southern regions. This divide is partly confirmed by electoral trends. Pro-reform, nationalist parties win consistent support in the west of the country, while the opposition Communist Party is dominant in the East and South. On the basis of this initial evidence, however, it is still not possible to distinguish whether trends in public attitudes and formal politics signal a deeper, permanent divide between Ukraine's macro-regions or whether the country is witnessing a temporary detour on the path to forging a unified national polity.

The significance of regional differences in Ukraine have been the subject of much debate (Barrington, 1997; Clem, 1995; Hesli, 1998; Khmelko and Wilson, 1997; Miller, White, and Heywood, 1998; Pirie, 1996).[3] Concern has been expressed about the presence of a large ethnic-Russian minority in eastern Ukraine, and the possibility that political and economic disparities within the country may lead to irredentist sentiment among this population (Brzezinski, 1997). However, in recent surveys of the Ukrainian population, Miller, White and Heywood (1998) have found empirical evidence to counter predictions of Ukraine's ethnic disintegration. In examining three aspects of nationalist values (internal cultural conformity, external relations and political centralism), Miller, White and Heywood (1998, p. 287) conclude that language had much more influence than nationality on nationalist attitudes. In other words, there is little difference between Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians in public attitudes towards ethnic nationalism. Kuzio (1997b), reviewing the trajectory of the Ukrainian nation-state since independence, is more adamant in claiming that civic nationalism remains dominant in the country, and that despite regional variations in social and economic conditions, fundamental cultural or ethnic cleavages have yet to emerge in Ukraine.

To suggest that civic nationalism permeates Ukrainian politics at the national scale is not the same as suggesting that a single civic culture unites the country's distinctive regions – either at the macro-scale of East and West Ukraine or at the oblast scale. Crucial questions concerning the regional dimensions of civic development in Ukraine remain unanswered. Are levels of civic participation higher in West Ukraine, with its apparent attraction to liberal models of economic and political reform? Is there a significant disparity in the development of democratic civic culture among the country's oblasts? Might such potential regional disparities frustrate the formation of a unified civil society which is the ultimate foundation for civic nationalism?

Democracy and Civil Society – Regional Dimensions

There is a growing consensus among researchers and commentators on post-Soviet affairs that the success of democratic transitions in East and Central Europe depends to a large extent on the establishment and maintenance of civil societies (McAllister and White, 1994; McFaul, 1997; Vorontsova and Filatov, 1997). This emphasis on the civic sphere reflects broader debates about the nature of democracy and its future vitality -- not only in the newly independent states of East-Central Europe, but in the core nation-states of the developed world (Bellah et al., 1986; Boggs, 1997; Kaplan, 1997; Fukuyama, 1995; Green, 1985; Oldfield, 1990; Pangle, 1988; Putnam, 1995, 1996; Sandel, 1982). In the West, social critics have lamented declining rates of electoral participation, growing distrust of government agencies, and intensifying alienation from formal politics as symptoms of a more fundamental erosion of democratic beliefs and practices. Critics on both the Right and Left of the political spectrum have targeted falling levels of participation in the informal civic arena as the root cause of ailing democracy (Barber 1984; Berry et al., 1993; Boggs, 1997; Elshtain 1995; Foley and Edwards, 1998; Galston, 1991; Held, 1993; Kearns, 1991; Lasch, 1995; Sandel 1996). According to this view, formal institutions are necessary, but not sufficient in themselves, to sustain healthy democracies. Rather, a vibrant, active civil society is the crucial medium through which democratic beliefs and practices are affirmed – within and across generations (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993a; Rice and Feldman, 1997).

The question that follows on the heels of these critiques is, of course, how to establish and maintain a 'vibrant' civil society. While individual prescriptions vary, a growing contingent of social critics in the West are united in believing that the answer ultimately lies in the concept of "social capital" (Foley and Edwards, 1997, 1998; Portes, 1998; Wall et al., 1998). Social capital can be defined as "the features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993a p. 35). The term has its origins in sociology, where it has traditionally been employed to substantiate the social embeddedness of individual actions (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Foley and Edwards, 1997, 1998; Granovetter, 1985; Loury, 1987; Portes, 1998). In theories of democratic development, it refers to the unwritten rules of interaction and reciprocity that enabled individuals to transcend narrow self-interest and to participate in civic-oriented activities (Foley and Edwards, 1997, 1998; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993a, 1995; Wall, et al., 1998). Depending on levels of social capital present in a community or society, individuals will be more or less disposed to cooperate for 'the common good.' Interestingly, even as social capital is a prerequisite for civic interaction, it is civic interaction which affirms the utility of social capital and secures its reproduction over time (Putnam 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1996). This relationship between social capital and civic engagement has at times been described as a "virtuous circle" (Levi, 1996; Putnam, 1993a).

In Western democracies the challenge is to reinvigorate democracy by solidifying this virtuous circle from the local to national scale. In East-Central Europe, however, the task is both more basic and more daunting: to establish the mutual orbit between social capital and civic engagement from the ground up. The problem is not that social capital is absent from societies in the region. In sociological terms, social capital inheres in all interpersonal relationships – it is a basic element of familial, clan, or communal interactions (Coleman, 1990; De Souza Briggs, 1997; Portes, 1998; Wall, et al., 1998). However, not all forms of social capital are readily adaptable to the purposes of civic engagement (Levi, 1996; Portes, 1998; Potapchuk, et al., 1997). In East-Central Europe, historically underdeveloped civil societies have led to a situation in which the predominant forms of social capital actually isolate specific groups or communities from the wider civic arena (Ashwin, 1998; Grodelund, et al., 1998; Hedlund and Sundstrom 1996; Kolankiewicz, 1996; Nichols, 1996; Petro, 1995; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1997). The dual challenge in sustaining democratic transitions in

East-Central Europe is simultaneously to stimulate civic-oriented social capital while creating practical opportunities for cooperation and interaction among individual citizens.

Whether civic-oriented social capital can be intentionally created through the intervention of formal state institutions is a matter of debate (cf. De Souza Briggs, 1997; Fukuyama, 1995; Lappe and DuBois, 1997; Levi, 1996; Potapchuk, et al., 1997; Putnam, 1993a, 1993b, 1995). The most generous position holds that over time insular forms of social capital can indeed evolve into norms of trust and reciprocity that facilitate civic cooperation (Potapchuk, et al., 1997; Lappe and Dubois, 1997). The key moment in this transformation is the transcendence of parochial self-interest at the scale of the local or regional community (Potapchuk, et al., 1997, pp. 131-133). The role of geography in this process is more than ancillary. In a twenty year study of regional governments in Italy, Putnam (1993a) found a remarkable correlation between the effectiveness of democratic governance and local levels of social capital. Putnam concluded that regional context – that is, place-based traditions of social interaction and organization – played a far more influential role in the success of democratic governance than, for instance, levels of economic development. Integrating his findings from Italy with observations on contemporary civic life in the West, Putnam (1993b, 1995, 1996) has subsequently stated more emphatically that regional and local contexts constitute critical factors in the constitution of civil societies. Place matters in the development of democratic civic culture (Edwards and Foley, 1998).

Returning to Putnam's study of democratic government in Italy, it is interesting to note that, while he emphasizes the role of regional contexts in determining levels of civic development, he fails adequately to explore the possibility that what is unfolding in Italy is the development of not one, but multiple, distinct civic cultures. Rephrased, Putnam does not consider the possibility that persistence of regional differences in civic development might in fact undermine the preservation (or consolidation) of civil society at the national scale. This is not a moot question in the case of Italy, where economic cleavages between North and South have spawned political campaigns that embrace at least the rhetoric of territorial separation (Goldberg, 1996). It is also not a moot question with respect to East-Central Europe. In this region, cultural, economic, and territorial fault lines are ever-present obstacles to the consolidation of national polities. Regional inequalities in civil society might yet emerge as another fault line in these newly emerging democracies.

The present investigation of civic development in Ukraine is concerned with both the regional contexts in which democratic principles and values take root, and with the persistence of regional differences that may in the long-term encourage the formation of localized, as opposed to national civic cultures. Emulating Putnam's study of democratic development in Italy, our study charts geographical variations in the level and nature of civic participation in order to gauge the degree to which regional contexts influence the assimilation of democratic values and practices. Civic participation may, of course, take various forms. Here, data on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is utilized to evaluate the varying degrees to which an autonomous citizenry has emerged in Ukraine since independence in 1991.[4]

Civic Engagement and Levels of NGO Activity in Ukraine

As in other East-Central European countries, NGOs in Ukraine have faced an uphill battle in establishing themselves as an influential voice in politics and public policy-making. In part, this situation can be attributed to the factors outlined above: historically weak civic traditions and the continuing absence of civic-oriented social capital. Mirroring perceptions of the democratic transition as a whole, Ukrainians tend to support NGO activity in principle, while remaining skeptical about the practical benefits of NGO membership. In 1996, a nation-wide survey conducted by IFES found that approximately half of all Ukrainians felt that NGOs were a vital and necessary element in sustaining democracy. (In the capital city, Kyiv, the percentage holding this view reached 75%) (Skoczylas 1997). Moreover, a majority of the survey's respondents also believed that conditions in the country were favorable for the formation of NGOs. At the same time, however, only 25% of those surveyed indicated that they would consider joining an NGO. Among those in this minority, interest was highest (15%) in charitable organizations (i.e. organizations dedicated to helping either the poor or consumers), followed by women's organizations (12%), religious groups (12%), and environmental organizations (10%). Only 5% of those respondents who might consider joining an NGO expressed an interest in politically oriented associations (all figures from Skoczylas 1997).

When levels of NGO activity in Ukraine are portrayed in terms of actual memberships in organizations, the picture is even more bleak. The Fund for Democratic Initiatives and the Institute of

Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Ukraine, conducted a series of national surveys between 1991-1996 in which respondents were asked specifically whether they belonged to a civic organization (*gromads'kaya organizatsiya*) (Golovakha, 1997); the survey was subsequently updated in 1997 (Golovakha and Panina, 1998). With relatively large sample sizes (1740-1800 respondents), the surveys actually document rising levels of *non*-membership in civic organizations. In 1991, 65% of Ukrainians did not belong to a civic organization; this figure rose in subsequent years, from 70% in 1992 to 87% in 1996 (Golovakha, 1997). In 1997, the non-membership ratio peaked at 88% (Golovakha and Panina, 1998). In 1997 as well, memberships in sports clubs and religious groups were each held by 3% of Ukrainians; labor union membership by 2.1%; hobby clubs and student societies accounted by 1.5% each, and occupational societies and political parties for less than 1% each. The longitudinal surveys also included a specific question aimed at gauging the actual level of civic involvement: "During the past week (including the weekend), did you take part at least once in a civic work or activity?" In 1994, 5% of those surveyed responded in the affirmative; in 1997, only 3.5% did so. Overall, national trends for civic participation in Ukraine demonstrate a remarkably consistent decline (Panina and Golovakha, 1995).

Sensitive to the fact that questions regarding active membership in civic organizations might underestimate the wider potential for civic engagement by Ukrainian citizens, the longitudinal surveys administered by the Fund for Democratic Initiatives and the Institute of Sociology also questioned respondents about less organized forms of activism, such as popular protest. Specifically, the surveys asked respondents to identify circumstances under which they would be willing to engage in protests, and also what forms of protests they felt were most effective or legitimate. Revealingly, the percentage of respondents who agreed with the proposition that "it is necessary at all costs to preserve social order, peace and harmony" -- that is, protest is not constructive under any circumstances -- declined steadily from 43.8% in 1994 to 28.9% in 1997. Over the same period, the percentage of respondents concurring with the proposition that "it is necessary to protest against the constant lowering of living standards" rose from 22.7% in 1994 to 36.6% in 1997.[5] The apparent increase in the public's willingness to vocalize its dissatisfaction is tempered by rather narrow perceptions of what constitutes legitimate, effective means of protest. Between 1994 and 1997, the

percentage of respondents who ruled out actively taking part in any form of protest -- whether legal or illegal -- actually increased from 31.9% to 37.3%. For the remaining respondents, legal means of mobilization were viewed more favorably than illegal ones. Thus, modes of civil disobedience, such as sit-ins, picketing, boycotts, or spontaneous strikes consistently received minimal support (between 1-7%) across all years. Legal modes of mobilization fared better, but public faith in their effectiveness gradually wavered. Thus in 1997, 10% of respondents were ready to volunteer in election campaigns (down from 15% in 1994), 11.3% were willing to organize petitions (down from 17% in 1994), and 14.8% were willing to attend a legal meeting or demonstration (down from 16.6% in 1994).[6]

The discouraging portrait of civic engagement painted by national surveys mirrors the overall pattern of intensifying political alienation in Ukraine. Under worsening economic conditions, it is reasonable to argue, as does Ferguson (1998, 3) that declining levels of political and civic activism can be attributed to the constant, pressing challenge of "putting food on the table". This is the logic of Abraham Maslow's "hierarchy of needs". Ferguson (1998, 3) quotes Seryevev (1997) that "severe deprivation of physiological needs eclipses the influence of more abstract concerns on individual attitudes and actions. In this environment, political objects ... are more likely to be evaluated in terms of their ability to alleviate the pressure of unsatisfied wants." This last phrase is crucial. While the abstract qualities of democracy may be irrelevant to the everyday lives of Ukrainian citizens, practical forms of civic activism may in fact have greater significance for the material well-being of individuals. Harking back to the discussion of social capital and civic interaction, the ultimate purpose of cooperation among individuals is the attainment of mutual benefit. Civic activism and basic needs can be coincidental. In this light, looking beyond national-scale reports of low or declining civic participation becomes more critical.

In the remainder of this paper, oblast-level data on NGOs, public attitudes, and socio-economic conditions are correlated and analyzed in order to discern the degree to which a sub-national geography of civic engagement exists in Ukraine. The key questions structuring the analysis are essentially threefold. Do cultural-historical factors (as opposed to socio-economic conditions) play a key role in determining levels of civic engagement in a given oblast? Does the form of civic engagement vary by oblast? Do the level and

form of civic engagement in an oblast mirror patterns of public support for a market economy and political democracy?

Methodology and Data

As for many other aspects of post-Soviet political life, it is difficult to gather empirical information that accurately estimates the nature and extent of civic engagement in Ukraine. As indicated in the previous section, survey data clearly indicate a low level of club and organizational memberships nation-wide (less than 10% of the population when union membership is excluded). Furthermore, standard survey data do not indicate the geographic distribution of membership. In order to examine the regional dimensions of civic activity, indirect measures must therefore be employed. Two principal sources of information are utilized for the present study: a detailed regional (oblast-level) IFES survey conducted in 1994 and an extensive directory of officially registered non-governmental organizations in Ukraine published in 1998 by the Counterpart Creative Center (*Tvorchiy Tsentr Kaunterpart*), Kyiv.[7] The latter includes data on the membership size, stated mission, funding sources, and geographical scale of activity for 2659 NGOs in Ukraine. Together these data provide a partial, but revealing, picture of geographic variations in the development of civil society in Ukraine. By correlating data from the IFES survey and the Counterpart directory with oblast-level socio-economic indicators, it is possible to obtain a clearer view of the contextual factors that influence the distribution not only of civic attitudes but also civic engagement.[8]

Data from the 1994 IFES survey are drawn from a national sample of 1,200 respondents that was weighted to reflect the relative population size of Ukraine's oblasts. It provides information on the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and includes subjective responses to an extensive array of political-attitudinal questions. Here, specific reference is made to the oblast-level results for three key factors: 1) electoral participation; 2) feelings of political empowerment:3) (dis)satisfaction with the general state of political and economic affairs. Each of these attitudinal measures is considered as an independent predictor of NGO activity in individual oblasts. However, geographic variations in the attitudinal measures themselves are charted since they offer insight into the regional contexts in which civil society is developing. We develop

a ratio incorporating the population size for each oblast Figure in order to standardize scores for the three factors, and to permit comparisons between oblasts. For example, the 10% of the national IFES survey respondents who have voted in all elections and also live in Donet'sk oblast was divided by Donet'sk's portion of the Ukrainian total population (about 10%) to create a ratio of 1.0. Values above 1.0 thus indicate over-representation on an individual measure and values less than 1.0 are below the national average. Indicators for electoral participation, feelings of empowerment, and (dis)satisfaction with political-economic transition are mapped on the basis of the Ukrainian oblasts in 1b-1d.

The dependent variables in the present analysis of civic engagement in Ukraine are drawn from the Counterpart directory of NGOs. The directory was compiled on the basis of a questionnaire mailed to officially registered NGOs in Ukraine. Completion and submission of the questionnaire was entirely voluntary. Individual entries within the directory include information for the following categories: city and oblast of location, address and contact information, date of founding and/or registration, number of members, geographic scale of operation (local, regional, national or international), sources of funding (state, private, membership dues, grants, commercial activity, or other), and type of activities (charitable, cultural, environmental, educational, political, veteran affairs, women's issues, youth issues, or miscellaneous).[9] It should be noted that the ratio of non-responses to responses in each category of the directory varies significantly from oblast to oblast. Membership size is the category with the most frequent non-reports: the ratio reaches its maximum value of 82.03% in L'viv oblast, followed by 58.67% in Kyiv oblast. While our analysis does not rely on membership data, we incorporate information on funding sources, where non-reporting ratios reach to 19.49% in Kyiv oblast (including the city of Kyiv), 11.48% in Kirovhrad and 8.45% in L'viv.[10]

It is unclear from the text accompanying the Counterpart directory precisely how representative the data are. The introduction to the directory claims that there are approximately 18,000 officially registered NGOs in Ukraine. However, no source material is cited for this estimate. In 1996, the United Nations Human Development Report recorded a total of 840 officially registered NGOs in the country: 156 internationally-based NGOs and 684 nationally-based NGOs. The fact that the UN report makes no

reference to regionally- or locally-based NGOs may account for some of the discrepancy between its accounting of NGO activity and the estimate put forth by Counterpart. Recalling that the overall level of participation in NGOs is relaetively low throughout Ukraine, it is more revealing to note that the overall distribution of types of NGO activities is virtually the same in both the Counterpart directory and the UN Human Development Report. In both instances, charitable, educational, scientific, sports, and cultural associations account for the bulk of registered NGOs (United Nations, 1996; Counterpart 1998).This consistency increases confidence that the organizations included in the Counterpart directory are in fact representative of the overall distribution of NGOs in Ukraine..

Another concern with respect to the Counterpart directory is the potential for regional biases in the reporting of NGO data. While the directory includes information on a significant percentage of Ukraine's registered NGOs, it is unclear if organizations in particular regions of the country responded to the mailed questionnaire at higher rates than in other areas. If such regional over-sampling occurred, it would obviously bias the present analysis.

In order to check for such regional over-sampling biases, we examined the overall NGO index (the national ratio of organizations in each oblast divided by the national ratio of population in each oblast) by mapping the index at the oblast level. The distribution is shown in Figure 2a. There is no obvious regional clustering of high and low values of the index. Both western oblasts (L'viv and Transcarpathia) and eastern oblasts (Donets'k, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia) are represented in the "higher than average" category. Conversely, an eastern oblast (Luhans'k) is represented in the "lower than average" class along with western (Volyn and Chernivtsi) and central oblasts (Poltava, Vinnytsia and Chernihiv). The two highest ratios are found in Kyiv and L'viv oblasts. Kyiv as the national capital contains 19 % of the sample organizations, almost double its share of the national population (about 10 percent). Such a high ratio is not surprising given that the oblast is home to the Ukrainian capital. A disproportionate number of organizations are clearly attracted to Kyiv City because of the access it affords to national and international agencies.[11]

L'viv oblast is characterized by an even higher ratio of NGOs than Kyiv oblast. Of the NGOs included in the Counterpart directory, over 24% are located in L'viv oblast, while the oblast boasts only 5%

of the national population. Given that one of the agencies charged with actually distributing and collecting the Counterpart questionnaire is based in the oblast capital of L'viv, it is possible that a regional bias was introduced to the sample returns. However, there are historical and cultural factors that might also explain the relatively high level of civic activism in the region. The city of L'viv and the surrounding territory have a long history of local activism, dating from Austro-Hungarian times. Exceptional levels of political and social activism in this historic region of Galicia have been well documented throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including even during the Soviet era (Birch, 1995; Applebaum, 1994; Holdar, 1995; Kuzio, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b; Riabchouk, 1998; Szporluk, 1992; Wilson, 1997). In the late 1980s, the pro-independence platform of the Rukh nationalist movement garnered widespread popular suppport in L'viv oblast (Motyl, 1994), and during the same period, numerous coal-miner strikes were first visible in the west of the country, not in the industrial heartland of the Donbas. Since Ukrainian independence in 1991, L'viv oblast has consistently stood out in terms of high electoral turnout, local party activism, and vocal participation in national debates over issues of language, culture, and political reform. Thus, it is highly plausible that the high ratio of NGO activity in L'viv oblast is symptomatic of generally high levels of civic awareness and engagement and is not an artifact of data-gathering mechanisms.

As noted earlier, for the purposes of the present analysis, the attitudinal data from the IFES survey are treated as independent variables, while the the NGO data from the Counterpart directory are considered as dependent variables. The distribution of the three independent variables mentioned above – electoral participation, feelings of political empowerment, and (dis)satisfaction with the general state of political and economic affairs – are examined first (Figure 1). Subsequently, regional variations in levels of NGO activity are examined in terms of the following dependent variables: the ratio of NGOs to population size, the geographical scale of NGO activity, and NGO funding sources (Figures 2 and 3). The distribution of dependent variables is analyzed with respect to: 1) the political-attitudinal data from the IFES survey; 2) socio-economic indicators for each oblast; 3) electoral turnout for the March 1998 parliamentary elections in Ukraine; and, 4) historical-cultural evidence for the regional mosaic of Ukraine. Summary spatial statistics, that indicate the extent of geographic clustering of civic activism, are first presented before regression analysis

of the NGO measures (as dependent variables) with political-attitudinal and socio-economic indicators for each of Ukraine's oblasts. Because of the small size of the sample (26 oblasts), most of the statistics are not significant and only those relationships that meet the statistical criteria for inclusion in the regression models are presented. All analyses were completed using the *Spacestat*© software, described in Anselin (1992).

Results from the multi-dimensional analysis are presented in terms of three central hypotheses regarding the regional distribution of civic engagement in Ukraine, measured by levels of NGO activity at the oblast level. The first hypothesis holds that the level of NGO activity in an oblast will be a function of antecedent activity, itself connected to the historical experience of the region. In this respect, the checkered boundary history of Ukraine comes strongly into play. In particular, the "Galician phenomenon" deserves special attention. The relatively recent annexation of this western region to Ukraine in 1939, and its distinctive legacy of local cultural and political activity, marks off the oblasts of Ivano-Frankiv'sk, L'viv and Ternopil' (Figure 1) from the rest of the country which endured a longer history of Tsarist, then Soviet domination. We will check for the accuracy of the perception that, even in contemporary times, Galicia is easily distinguished from the rest of the country by its level of civic engagement.

The second hypothesis expands on the regional distribution question by postulating that types of NGO activity will vary significantly with regional location or context. More, concretely, it is expected that disproportionately more NGOs devoted to political and cultural activities will be based in the western region of the country, especially in Galicia, as compared to East and South Ukraine. The third hypothesis posits that levels of NGO activity and membership will vary in relation to the general political attitudes and participation rates of oblast populations. In oblasts with high levels of dissatisfaction with political-economic reform and low levels of electoral participation, for example, relatively low levels of NGO activity and membership are expected. Conversely, in regions with higher turnout rates and greater popular optimism about the future, higher levels of NGO activity are anticipated. By extension, the extent of NGO activity is expected to vary in conjunction with the overall socio-economic conditions in individual oblasts.

Political Attitudes and Civic Engagement in the Ukrainian Oblasts

The IFES survey conducted in Ukraine in December 1994 took place after the first open, post-independence parliamentary and presidential elections in that same year. While the principal aim of the survey was to gauge the degree to which the Ukrainian population was interested and engaged in the electoral process, the questionnaire also probed as to personal economic circumstances, perceptions of Ukrainian democracy, attitudes towards political participation, and sources of political alienation. Since oblasts were incorporated as basic elements of the sampling frame, results from the survey of 1,200 voting-age citizens can be analyzed at both the national and regional scale.

The overall survey results clearly indicate that in 1994, while Ukrainians were generally supportive of the principles of democracy, they had strong misgivings about its practical implementation. At the same time, the survey results indicate a growing dissatisfaction with political and economic reform and an increasingly pessimistic outlook in terms of the country's economic future. The authors of the IFES report which accompanies the survey results conclude that the Ukrainian population in 1994 could be roughly classified into three broad groupings; the disaffected (about 25% of the total), the futurists (40%) and the persuadables (about 35%) (IFES, 1995). The disaffected were disproportionately residents of East Ukraine, supporters of the Communist Party, older, more likely to be women, of lower socio-economic rank, non-religious, and generally pessimistic about the future. The futurists, by contrast, were disproportionately residents of West Ukraine, optimistic about the future, supporters of President Kuchma and his program of free-market reform, , younger, better informed about politics, church-going and desirous that Ukraine develop closer ties with the West. As might be expected, the persuadables represented a mixed population, but included notably: single women with children, the youngest voters, and older people who were more religious. (IFES, 1995). In broad terms, the first two groups that emerge from the IFES survey match the categories of so-called "winners" (futurists) and "losers" (disaffected) identified by Kitschelt (1992) for the countries of central and eastern Europe. According to Kitschelt, the respective fortunes of the winners and losers have been shaped in large part by market reform and the privatization of formerly socialist economies. He argues that the economic-material circumstances of winners and losers map onto the general political attitudes and beliefs

held by members of these groups. Though Ukraine has not privatized as widely or deeply as some other former Soviet republics, such as Russia, its society has still experienced significant economic polarization and already demonstrates electoral cleavages, not unlike those evidenced in Russia (O'Loughlin, Shin and Talbot, 1996; O'Loughlin, Kolossov and Vendina, 1997).[12]

The political-attitudinal factors associated with the division of Ukrainian society into three broad groupings -- disaffected, futurist, and persuadable -- do not display clear regional cleavages. The three factors participation, empowerment, and dissatisfaction are mapped in Figure 1b-1d. Participation refers to the percentage of registered voters in each oblast who have participated in all elections since 1991. The average figure for Ukraine was 67.7%; the participation rate for each oblast is again standardized by the population of the oblast. The resulting map is displayed in Figure 1b. The map is notable for its lack of spatial coherence and the non-significant spatial autocorrelation statistic for these data indicate no geographic clustering; the Z-value associated with the Morans I statistic is 1.37 and the associated probability is .17.[13] The highest values are found in mixed rural-urban oblasts in the center (Cherkasy, Kherson and Kirovohrad), the three Galician oblasts (Ivano-Frankiv'sk, L'viv and Ternopil') as well as Rivne in the west, and industrial Luhan'sk in the east of the country. While the Galician over-representation is expected on the basis of a long history of disproportionate political involvement, there is no evident explanation for the other high values. Like the high values, the lowest values are found in a *mélange* of oblasts, ranging from industrial and Russified Kharkiv in the East, to Crimea with its 67% ethnic Russian population, to predominantly Ukrainian and rural Volyn oblast in the far northwest of the country. The low value for Crimea is no surprise as the special nature of the peninsula in Ukrainian political life, both internally and externally with Russia, is well-known. Since Ukrainian independence in 1991, there has been an active autonomy movement among the Russian majority in Crimea and this has resulted in numerous confrontations with the Kyiv administrations. Crimea is one of the oblasts of strongest support of the Communist party but this opposition is muted by lower than average turnout in national elections.

The map displaying levels of empowerment in Ukraine also fails to indicate significant clustering (Figure 1c). The IFES survey asked respondents whether the act of voting empowered citizens and gave

them a meaningful voice in the governing process; high levels of empowerment indicate a sense that voting and political participation matter in Ukraine's transition to a liberal democracy. As in the case of participation, the three Galician oblasts of the West are distinguished by strong feelings of empowerment, as is the nearby oblast of Vinnitsia. The disproportionately Russian-speaking regions of Crimea, Luhans'k and Donets'k are also characterized by above average scores in terms of empowerment, as is the capital city of Kyiv (Figure 1c). The Morans I score does not indicate significant spatial clustering. This map is somewhat surprising since it is the regions of the East that are often considered to be among the highest in political alienation. However, these are also regions which rank high in support for the Communist party. It is possible that Communist supporters feel empowered in utilizing the ballot box as a means of opposing or condemning policies emanating from the Ukrainian national government (O'Loughlin and Kubicek, 1999).

Levels of dissatisfaction with the general state of political and economic affairs in Ukraine are associated with more pronounced regional cleavages than either participation rates or feelings of empowerment. Higher than average levels of dissatisfaction (the national average itself is 94%) are concentrated in the three eastern oblasts of Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv and Donets'k, where industrially based economies have faced severe setbacks due to the loss of markets in the former Soviet Union, declining state subsidies, and the shift to new supply networks. The isolated rural area of Transcarpathia in the far west, as well as the rural area around Kyiv (but not Kyiv city) are also regions of high dissatisfaction (Figure 1d). Two of the three Galician oblasts (but not Ivano-Frankivs'k) and the adjoining region of Chernivtsi fall into the lowest dissatisfaction category, as do three separate oblasts in the center and east. In statistical terms, these regional patterns are associated with significant geographic clustering. The Morans I score is 3.449 and the associated probability is .001. Interestingly, this spatial clustering does not necessarily correspond to socio-economic conditions in individual oblasts. Four of the oblasts (Donets'k, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv, and Kyiv) with the highest dissatisfaction scores are also in the top-quartile of the oblasts on the 1995 U.N. Human Development index, whilst four of the oblasts (L'viv, Chernivtsi, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivs'k) with the lowest level of dissatisfaction are also in the bottom half of the oblasts based on the UN index of human development.

The dependent variables drawn from the 1998 Counterpart directory of officially registered NGOs in Ukraine reveal an equally complex regional mosaic in terms of higher- or lower-than-average levels of civic engagement. Eight variables related to NGO activity are mapped in Figures 2 and 3. The most general index of NGO activity is displayed in Figure 2a. Here the index for a given oblast is reported as a ratio of the national proportion of NGOs to the oblast's percentage of the Ukrainian national population. An above average score, for example, indicates a disproportionate number of NGOs relative to the oblast's population size. As might be anticipated from an examination of the map, the Morans I statistic for this distribution is non-significant (Z-value –0.369 and probability of .711). The largest density of NGOs lies in some of the most Russified oblasts (Donets'k, Odessa, Kharkiv, Crimea and Zaporizhzhia), in the capital district of Kyiv and in the least Russified zone (L'viv and Transcarpathia). Conversely, the lowest density of NGOs shows a similar national spread. The concentration of NGOs in particular oblasts may be explained, in part, by the fact that the majority of NGOs from the Counterpart directory selected larger administrative centers as their base of operations. This preference would favor oblasts with the largest administrative centers, such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donets'k, L'viv and Crimea (Sevastopol and Simferopol). Overall, the geographic spread of the NGO ratio suggests little underlying structural causation that is correlated with region.

The geographical scale of activity among NGOs in Ukraine is displayed in Figures 2a - 2d. The maps are mirrors of each other since their total adds to nearly 100% (very few internationally-oriented NGOs are present in Ukraine). According to the Counterpart directory, each NGO is identified as either "local", "regional" or "national" in terms of its scope of activity. "Local" refers to the city or *rayon*-level, , "regional" indicates the oblast-level, and "national" denotes NGOs that purport to serve the interests of populations across the entire country. None of the distributions for this factor are spatially clustered, and the patterns are geographically random with high and low values equally distributed amongst the Ukrainian macro-regions. However, a few prominent values are worthy of note. The majority of the NGOs in Kyiv oblast have a national range, as might be expected in the case of the capital region. Interestingly, NGOs in Crimea, one of the most distinctive regions of the country, also rank high in the category of national-level activity. L'viv, with the largest density of NGOs, stands out as the top-ranked oblast in the local-oriented category, while

Donets'k, the eastern metropolis, reifies its status as center of a distinctive region by leading in the regionally-oriented category.

The final series of maps in Figure 3a – 3d indicates the dominant sources of funding for NGOs in Ukraine. As mentioned earlier, these figures are somewhat compromised by the fact that within the Counterpart directory the funding category had significant non-reporting rates in three of 26 oblasts: Kyiv (19.49%), Kirovhrad (11.48%) and L'viv (8.45%). This caveat not withstanding, it is still useful to consider the degree to which NGO activity has been able to separate itself from state sponsorship and achieve financial autonomy. The Counterpart directory identifies six basic types of funding sources: state, private, membership dues, grants, commercial activity, and "other". (It was possible for a NGO respondent to list more than one funding source, though typically only one source was given for an individual NGO). We focus on state, private and other sources of funding. State-funding is most prominent in the oblasts of Chernihiv, Ternopil, Sumy, Lugans'k and Transcarpathia, with over 25% of NGOs funded through this method. Private funding is most important in Transcarpathia, Odessa, Dnipropetrovs'k, Poltava and Khemel'nits'kyi with over 75% of the NGOs reporting private contributions. The three industrial eastern oblasts (Luhans'k, Donets'k, Kharkiv), as well as Crimea, lead the oblasts in the category of "other funding" though the precise nature of funding is unclear. As in the case of the preceding NGO measures, none of the distributions for the three funding sources are geographically clustered.

The absence of significant regional cleavages in the levels or type of NGO activity in Ukraine comes into sharper focus when compared to oblast-level turnout for the March 1998 parliamentary elections. Turnout rates for the elections vary dramatically among the country's oblasts and macro-regions [14]and exhibit statistically significant spatial clustering (the Z-score, associated with Morans I, for the turnout results is 4.85, with a probability of less than .001). Figure 3d underscores that in contrast to the informal political sphere, electoral participation is highly regionalized in Ukraine.

Returning to the first hypothesis, that the level of NGO activity in individual oblasts is a function of antecedent activity, the data mapped in Figures 2 and 3 offers partial support for this conclusion. With respect to political-attitudinal indicators, Galicia definitely stands apart from the rest of the country (and to a

certain degree even from the broader western region of Ukraine) as a place of greater optimism about the country's future, broader approval of the current political and economic situation, and more widespread trust in formal political institutions. However, Galicia is not readily distinguishable from other regions of Ukraine in terms of NGO activity. On the basis of the present analysis, it would be too bold to claim that an uniquely Galician civic culture exists within Ukraine today. Galicia is more distinctive in electoral terms, turnout (Figure 3d) and party support (Craumer and Clem, 1999) than in measures of civic engagement. The absence of pronounced regional cleavages in the development of Ukrainian civil society does not necessarily indicate that place or regional context plays no role in the transformation of civic and political culture in Ukraine. However, it does complicate the oft-cited image of Ukraine as a country divided politically, ethnically, and linguistically between East and West (Clem, 1995; Kubicek, 1999). While this bifurcated model can be useful in certain contexts, the present analysis suggests that, in more concrete terms, Ukraine's civic-political transition is characterized by not one, but multiple regional distinctions.

Explaining the Distribution of NGO Activity in Ukraine.

As stated above, data on the level and type of NGO activity in Ukraine does not indicate significant variation by oblast or region. However, formal political behavior, such as turnout for the 1998 parliamentary elections, general political attitudes, and basic socio-economic indicators do vary geographically across the territory of Ukraine (Barrington 1997; Hesli, 1995; Miller, White and Heywood, 1998). Given the disparity in the degree of spatial clustering among indicators of NGO activity compared to other measures of political and economic change, it is reasonable to assume that regression models incorporating both sets of measures will document weak and statistically insignificant relationships between levels of NGO activity, general political attitudes, and socio-economic conditions. This assumption is tested in the following section.

In order to allow a wide and expansive examination of the correlates of various measures of civil society in Ukraine, a two-step procedure was developed. First, we correlated the non-governmental (NGO) measures with a wide variety of oblast characteristics, drawn from the national surveys of attitudes, 1989 Soviet census data, indicators of economic and population changes (Statistical Handbook, 1996), and electoral

data from 1994 and 1998. Second, after determining the significant relationships, we then calibrated a "constrained" model, using only the significant independent variables, in a spatial analytic framework (O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin, 1994). This procedure generates parsimonious models that accurately isolates the characteristics of the oblasts relevant to the distributions of civic memberships in Ukraine.

A complimentary picture to the civil society activities of the Ukrainian population can be obtained from a study of the attitudes of the voting-age population, which can be related to the oblast characteristics. From the inter-correlation matrix of all variables in the database (68 in total), it is evident that the attitudinal measures have many more significant correlations with the socio-economic measures than is the case for the NGO measures. The predictability of the attitudes of oblast residents is high if related to the extent of the economic changes in the oblast since 1991. There is a large amount of collinearity in the attitudes so, for example, the "better expectations" measure is strongly correlated with beliefs that Ukraine is a democracy, that voting empowers citizens, preference for the Western model of political and economic development, and frequency of voting. Oblasts with a high level of citizens who were "very dissatisfied" are consistently the oblasts that support Communists, have lower voter turnouts, a large amount of job dismissals, high unemployment, higher than average ratio of old people and women, more Russians, and a preference for close relations with Russia. From these correlations, one can accept the argument that Ukraine is a bifurcated society into the "pessimist" and "optimist" camps. However, as will be evident from an examination of the coefficients in Table 1, this possible bifurcation of Ukrainian is not yet advanced. The regression models presented in this table are somewhat inconsistent and display significant variation among the predictors, while demonstrating little support for the effects of the economic decline since 1991.

The constrained regression models that are presented in Table 1 are the result of a complex modelling procedure that began with a much larger set of independent predictors; all the models were checked for spatial autocorrelation in the error terms.[15] Table 1 displays only those relationships that are significantly related to the respective dependent variables, the responses to the questions in the IFES survey, 1994-95. Since there are only 26 cases in the analysis (the oblasts of Ukraine) and degrees of freedom are further reduced by the number of terms in the regression equation, it is not surprising that few relationships

are statistically significant. Though the adjusted R^2 values are reasonable, they are usually the result of a strong correlation with a single independent factor and the additional explanation of other predictors is reduced by a large amount of multi-collinearity. The regressions in Table 1, therefore, represent models without significant collinearity, with independence of the error terms and with significant relationships of t-values exceeding 1.70 for a one-tailed test (significance level =.05).

Most of the relationships in Table 1 revolve around the key issue of access to food. As noted earlier, from Van Atta's (1998) report, food consumption is declining in Ukraine and over half of all household wages is now spent on food. Using a Maslow-type hierarchy, the citizens of Ukraine are concerned first with meeting basic needs and responses to the question about the difficulty in finding and buying food are central to understanding the political and ideological motivations of citizens. As expected, a history of high turnout, measured by high ratios of "voting in all elections", is positively related to turnout in the March 1998 parliamentary elections. However, oblasts with large numbers of people reporting difficulty in buying food (largely in the east and south), are less likely to have a high turnout, as is evident in Figure 3d. The distribution of the answers to the question, "is Ukraine a democracy?" is related significantly to the distribution of the vote for Rukh, the nationalist party that is strongly-supported in western Ukraine, especially in Galicia. This explanation swamps all other independent predictors and demarcates the country into a nationalist west and a non-nationalist east and south, with the center around Kyiv as a transition zone. A third question related to the electoral situation in Ukraine, "does voting empower citizens?", produces the most complex model with four significant independent variables (Table 1). Two of the predictors are regional dummy variables for the East and South (negative coefficients) reflecting the mirror image of the Rukh support. Controlling for the regional effect, the relationships with the Western model (preferred economic model for Ukraine) and "difficulty to buy food" are positive and strong. It is in this model (and the model for "difficulty to buy food") that region emerges most clearly. In the other regression, the regional dummy measures are superseded by attitudinal measures that are expressed along an optimistic-pessimistic continuum.

Three questions in the IFES survey concerned general beliefs about the current situation in Ukraine and expectations for the future. The oblasts with higher ratios of citizens with more optimistic outlooks (better expectations for the future) were also the oblasts with more citizens who opted for the Western model of economic and political development; conversely, more pessimistic outlooks were associated with oblasts that preferred the development option of closer ties to Russia. The "difficulty to buy food" index is clearly regionalized, as indicated by the presence of only regional dummy variables in the regression equation (Table 1). (The Eastern region is not represented in the equation, serving as the control.) A negative coefficient in this case indicates less difficulty in buying food and this index, more than any other response, separates the east from the rest of the country. Finally, the oblasts with above average ratios of respondents who were very dissatisfied with the current situation in Ukraine are disproportionately those with a high ratio of Russians, located in the south and east. This model is the only one with a spatial autoregressive term for the dependent variable. In this instance, people in adjoining oblasts are also more likely to share the same level of dissatisfaction with the current situation, either high or low. However, it should be remembered that in 1994, over 93% of Ukrainians were "dissatisfied" and this measure only picks out the highest threshold of alienation. In contemporary Ukraine, the overlaps between the optimistic and pessimistic camps and national, regional and economic cleavages are significant, but not yet extreme. Only if the cleavages become more consistent and deeper will the nature and stability of the Ukrainian state be threatened.

Our second hypothesis suggests that there is a relationship between the type of NGO activity (cultural, charitable, etc) and the oblast characteristics. Of the many possible regressions, one for each of the NGO activities, funding, size, year of foundation and range, only 4 show any significant relationships (Table 2). As in the models for the attitudinal variables, all were calibrated in the spatial-structural framework, though none of the four models in the table display any spatially-lagged or dependent elements. This outcome is not surprising since the dependent variables display little geographic coherence, as can be seen in the maps in Figures 1 and 2.

The first model in Table 2 for the overall rate of NGO activity relates the ratio of NGOs (controlled for the oblast population) to the socio-economic characteristics of oblasts. Of the four significant

independent variables, two are regional dummies, for the East and South and both are positive. This regional effect can be anticipated from Figure 3a that shows the disproportionate ratios in the west and east of Ukraine, when compared to the center and the southern regions. Controlling for region, the relationship with the Russian-population presence is negative, though the coefficient is positive with the 1998 parliamentary vote for the Communist party. Conversely, one can project from these results that the relationships of NGO membership are positive with the nationalist vote and with the Ukrainian population. However, the effects, though significant, do not help much in understanding the relationships of the NGO ratio to the socio-economic character of oblasts, aside from regional location, nationality and Communist vote. We cannot detect any significant relationship with the differential effects of the economic crisis since 1991. One might suspect that NGO membership would be disproportionately lower in those oblasts that have been most adversely affected by the decline of industry and the rise in unemployment; it seems plausible to infer from the opinion surveys that individuals with more pressing needs of food and shelter have less time for civic engagement. While the positive relationship with the Communist vote is somewhat unexpected, after region is controlled, it raises the question of the extent to which NGOs are overtly or covertly political. Unfortunately, the NGO almanac does not allow for such estimation.

Three of the NGO activity indicators (activities concentrating on women's, cultural and youth issues) show significant relationships with the oblast characteristics and the results of the regression models are presented in Table 2. (None of the other NGO indices show any significance, despite the numerous tests and examinations of the data for these relationships). Even the regression coefficient for the independent predictor in the regression model for women's issues is barely significant. Combined with a low variance explained (adjusted $R^2 = .103$), this is a very weak model and only intimates that the NGOs devoted to women's issues are found less frequently in oblasts with a high Russian proportion of the population. Why this should be the case is not immediately clear and the weakness of the relationship does not merit further consideration of the issue.

The relationships in the regression model for the cultural NGO measure is consistent with the emphasis in the opinion surveys and the historical evidence of the central legacy of the Galician heartland in

Ukrainian culture. The only independent significant predictor is the percentage of the 1998 parliamentary vote for Rukh, the nationalist party whose support is concentrated in the western oblasts, especially in Galicia (Craumer and Clem, 1999). Since 1989, Rukh has been an active promoter of the distinctiveness of Ukrainian culture, history and language and has emphasized the country's central European heritage at the expense of its Eurasian traditions (O'Loughlin, 1999). A critical element in the re-construction of the Ukrainian identity is the separation of the Ukrainian and Russian legacies. The NGOs devoted to cultural issues are strongly concentrated in Galicia; while it is not always evident which "culture" they are promoting, it is clearly the case that the amount of cultural activity is significantly higher in the parts of Ukraine that were part of the Austro-Hungarian empire to 1918 and then of Poland to 1939. It is widely believed that the level of civic activism in those parts of the former Communist eastern Europe that were not part of the Tsarist empire is higher than the regions subject to Tsarist and then Bolshevik control. While this general relationship does not seem to hold consistently for the Ukrainian NGO oblast data, it seems to be the case for the cultural activities of the NGOs. Though it would be difficult to prove or disprove conclusively, further examination of the contemporary political effects of the historical legacy is merited.

The final regression model reports the results for the youth NGO activity. Again, the strongest relationship lies with the Rukh vote and youth NGO activity is also negatively correlated with the unemployment rate, which is highest in the south and east. The results of the three regressions are thus consistent, with women's, youth and cultural activities disproportionately concentrated in the west and relatively weaker in the south and east. As noted earlier in the paper, there remains the possibility that the NGO data examined in this paper might have a built-in western bias because of the location of the organizers in the L'viv region, though other indicators do not show any evident regional bias in the data. Thus, we can cautiously conclude that there is some evidence for a west-east dichotomy in Ukraine in the level of certain NGO activities. However, unlike many of the electoral, attitudinal and socio-economic indexes, there is no dramatic cleavage of Ukraine in the NGO measures.

Conclusions

From an extended review of the numerous opinion surveys that have probed the ideological, political, economic and social attitudes of the Ukrainian population over the past decade, it is obvious that most Ukrainians, regardless of location, are deeply worried by the continued economic slippage of the country and their own personal/family status. In a Maslow-type hierarchy, individuals are first of all concerned with meeting the basic needs of their households and express little interest in taking an active part in the building of a civic society in the country. There is a deep alienation from political life and a widespread impression that politicians, of all political hues, are corrupt and not generally interested in the welfare of their constituents. Respondents in the west of the country are consistently more optimistic about the future of the Ukrainian democracy that residents of the other regions and the western residents strongly support deepening of ties to West European and North American states with a parallel weakening of ties to the CIS states. A combination of linguistic-cultural-political interests and a better adaptation to the economic turmoil that has engulfed Ukraine since 1991 has distinguished the Galician oblasts from the rest of the country.

We began this study with a consideration of the political importance of the kinds of clubs, societies and other non-governmental organizations that were identified by Coleman (1982) and Putnam (1993) in the making of a civic society. As many authors have stated, a tradition of non-state organized activities is relatively absent in the states of the former Soviet Union and the implication is clearly that, given their continued absence, the process of constructing post-Soviet democracies will be greatly lengthened and perhaps, undermined. Surprisingly, few detailed studies of NGO life in the post-Soviet states have been completed, perhaps due to the lack of reliable and comparative data. Our study of the attitudes that underlie civic society and of the kinds of non-governmental organizations that currently exist in Ukraine does not lend much support to the optimistic camp, those who believe that a grass-roots democracy is slowly evolving in the former Soviet Union. Fewer than one in twenty Ukrainian citizens are even occasionally active in non-trade union organizations, as can be seen from the opinion surveys. Few citizens are interested in NGO work of a political nature; charitable work gets the plurality of any interest in civic engagement. Like Kubicek (1999, 1), we conclude that "If we define civil society as organized networks of citizens independent of the

state but capable of checking state power and influencing political authorities, then one cannot speak of a strong and vibrant civil society in Ukraine."

With regard to the organizations themselves, the estimated number of NGOs in a country of 51 million is small. There are strong regional differences in the ratio of NGOs to population with oblasts in the West and in the East showing most activity. Other measures of activity (funding, size, age and range of activity) do not vary much by region. Unlike Putnam who found a strong and consistent regional cleavage in Italy, we cannot claim that such a cleavage exists now in Ukraine. As noted by Riabchuk (1998), a variable level of activity of a population in civic engagement that coincides with a national divide can be dangerous in deepening existing language-national cleavages. This correlation is not yet advanced far in Ukraine and as long as the level of civic activism remains low, any regional disparity in the kinds of activities that exist will exert only a modest influence on any existing tensions that revolve around the Ukrainian nation-building exercise.

Most of the work on the political life and development of the post-Soviet states has focussed on electoral cleavages and parliamentary contests. While this is valuable in providing a formal picture of the nature of the post-Soviet debates about the external orientation of the states and the internal dynamics of the ideological contests, this work misses an important aspect of democracy-building, that of non-formal political life in the shape of non-governmental organizations. It may very well be the case that such groups, founded in the first blossoming of free political expression at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, are now fading in the harsh environment of daily struggle for a decent diet and maintenance of a regular wage. Continued monitoring of these trends is critical to building a more complete picture of the post-Soviet political scene and its directions.

Figure Captions

Figure 1. a) The oblasts of Ukraine; b) Ratio of voters who have participated in all elections since independence; c) Ratio of voters who feel empowered by the act of voting; and d) Ratio of voters who express dissatisfaction with the current state of Ukraine. All ratios are proportionate to the oblast population. Source of Data: National survey of 1200 voters in December 1994 and reported in IFES, 1995.

Figure 2. a) Ratio of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to population of oblasts, 1997; b) Ratio of non-governmental organizations with a local emphasis; c) Ratio of non-governmental organizations with a regional emphasis; and d) Ratio of non-governmental organizations with a national emphasis. All ratios are proportionate to the oblast population. Source of Data: Counterpart Creative Center, 1998.

Figure 3. a) Ratio of non-governmental organizations dependent on state funding; b) Ratio of non-governmental organizations funded by private member contributions; c) Ratio of organization funded from other sources; and d) Voter turnout in the March 1998 *Verkhovna Rada* elections. Ratios for the first three maps are proportionate to the oblast population. Sources: Counterpart Creative Center, 1998 and IFES, 1998 from their website:*ifes.ipri.kiev.ua.*

Table 1: Coefficients (and t-values) of Constrained Models for Attitudinal Variables

Turnout March 1998

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	0.627	0.02
Vote in all elections	0.431	4.67
Difficulty to buy food	-0.363	-4.64

Adjusted R2 = .483

Ukraine is a Democracy

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	1.659	2.16
Rukh% 1998	0.213	3.81

Adjusted R2 = .359

Voting Empowers

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	-0.901	-1.38
East	-2.041	-2.38
South	-1.312	-1.69
Difficulty to buy food	0.844	5.99
Western model	0.572	3.94

Adjusted R2 = .747

Better Expectations for the Future

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	0.966	1.40
Western model	0.748	4.71

Adjusted R2 = .468

Difficulty to buy food

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	6.833	8.14
South	-3.583	-2.69
West	-4.458	-4.01
Center	-3.547	-3.09

Adjusted R2 = .378

Very Dissatisfied with Current Situation

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	1.011	1.43
Russian%	0.079	3.73
W_Vdiss*	0.089	2.63

Adjusted R2 = .501

* Spatially-lagged dependent variable.

Table 2: Coefficients (and t-values) of Constrained Models for the NGO Variables.

NGO Rate

Variable	Coefficient	t-ratio
Constant	0.893	8.61
East	0.122	1.82
West	0.171	1.99
Russian%	-0.009	-3.93
Communist%	0.011	2.62

Adjusted R2 = .387

Women

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	8.779	3.68
Russian%	-0.101	-1.78

Adjusted R2 = .103

Cultural

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	22.309	3.51
Rukh% 1998	1.118	3.85

Adjusted R2 = .375

Youth

Variable	Coefficient	t-value
Constant	14.668	2.53
Unemployment	-2.593	-2.01
Rukh% 1998	0.815	4.98

Adjusted R2 = .503

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Footnotes

1. The authors are, respectively, Professor of Geography and Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Campus Box 487, Boulder, CO. 80309-0487.
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[2] Many of the items included in the longitudinal IFES surveys include categories labeled “don’t know” or “difficult to say.” We explicitly mention results for such categories only when it bears directly on the interpretation of substantive responses to survey questions

[3] The significance of regional differences has also been a subject of research and discussion with respect to Russia’s political-economic transition (see Ruble and Popson, 1998; Stoner-Weiss, 1997).

[4] We recognize that the relationship between NGOs and the development of civil society is not always straightforward. Under conditions of market reform, NGOs often operate in a sphere that is heavily influenced by state policy, as well as developments in the private sector. However, it is the very process of negotiating the boundaries of the public sphere that makes NGOs a useful measure of civic development. See Feldman (1997) for a useful discussion of these issues.

[5] A significant proportion of survey respondents in each year remained ambivalent about the role of public protest, claiming that it is “difficult to say".

[6] A declining interest in public protest in Ukraine is paralleled by similar developments in Russia. A recent survey by the United States Information Agency in Russia indicates that only 7 percent of Russians claim they have taken part in any political ally or demonstration and only 4 percent have gone on strike. This report asserts that the number of Russians prepared to engage in such protests has been declining because respondents are unconvinced that protests are effective (Goble, 22 January, 1999).

[7] The precise title of the directory is *Reference Guide to Non-Governmental Organizations in Ukraine* (*Dovidnik neuryadavikh organizatsiy Ukraini*). Funding for the compilation of the directory came from the Ukrainian branch of the Eurasia Fund, and the actual collection of information on non-governmental organizations was performed with assistance from the staff at the Resource Center for the Development of Citizen Organizations (“GURT”), based in Kyiv, and the Western Ukrainian Resource Center, based in L’viv. The Counterpart Creative Center is funded in part through the U.S. Agency for International Development.

[8] It is important to emphasize that while an oblast breakdown is a significant improvement on national-level data, the size of the oblasts (ranging from Donet’sk with over 5 million people to Chernivtsi oblast with about 940,000) precludes any consideration of local differences (including rural-urban contrasts).

[9] This list of types of organizational activity actually represents a condensation of 25 highly specific categories listed in the Counterpart directory. For the purposes of analysis it was more efficacious to reduce these 25 into 10 major categories, reflecting the most significant general types of activities pursued by NGOs in Ukraine.

10 We will use Kyiv instead of the Russian spelling "Kiev" in this paper because of its preferred use in Ukraine.

[11] In Poland, using a similar national sample of NGOs, Bialasiewicz (1997) found that Warsaw accounted for 20% of the total and even when controlled for population, the Polish capital still was over-represented in NGOs to the extent that it had double the national average.

12 As policy recommendations, the authors of the report place heavy emphasis on the implications of activities of American agencies and American NGOs. Thus, for example, they suggest that one of the sub-groups of the "persuadables", single women with children, could be reached with specialized service programs mounted by American NGOs.

13 The spatial autocorrelation statistic is Morans I and is calculated from $I = (N/S_o)\Sigma_i \Sigma_j w_{ij} x_i x_j / \Sigma_i x_i^2$ where w_{ij} is an element of a spatial weights matrix W that indicates whether or not i and j are contiguous; the spatial weights matrix is row-standardized such that its elements sum to one; x_i is an observation at location i (expressed as the deviations from the observation mean); and S_o is a normalizing factor equal to the sum of all weights ($\Sigma_i \Sigma_j w_{ij}$). The significance of Moran's I is assessed by a standardized z-score that follows a normal distribution and is computed by subtracting the theoretical mean from I and dividing the remainder by the standard deviation.

[14] For a more detailed geographic analysis of the March 1998 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, see Craumer and Clem, 1999.

15 The modeling followed the example of O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin (1994).